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Kazakhstan lacks the democratic institutions that have been shown to protect foreign
investors (Jensen, 2008; Li & Resnick, 2003). Nevertheless, as latecomers to globalization,
China’s resource-seeking state-owned enterprises (SOEs) must go, not only where re-
sources are, but also where they are available. These are often less than ideal investment
environments, such as Kazakhstan, where they are confronted by high corruption, weak
rule of law, and political risk. Focusing on investments by the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), this study analyzes how Chinese foreign economic policies, such as
aid and loans, assist Chinese SOEs in securing protection for their investments. They do so
by making key members of the Kazakh government stakeholders in the success of the
investments. In addition, the study details how Chinese government strategy has evolved
from one of simply buying off key members of the Kazakh government in order to gain
approval for investments to one of making institutions in the Kazakh state, such as Kaz-
MunaiGas, stakeholders in the long-term success of the investment in order to secure
protection for investments in a climate of political uncertainty.
Copyright  2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Scholars studying the politics of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), investment seeking a long-term controlling
interest in a business enterprise in a foreign country, have
shown how democratic institutions, particularly thosearch Center, Hanyang
lsevier
nter, Hanyang University. Prodestablishing rule of law and constraining the actions of
political leaders, protect foreign investors, thereby
enhancing FDI inﬂows (Jensen, 2008; Li & Resnick, 2003).
Despite its status as a nominal democracy, democratic in-
stitutions in Kazakhstan are weak, as exempliﬁed by the
fact that the country’s leader, President Nursultan Naza-
rbayev has been in ofﬁce for more than two decades; the
last leader of Soviet Kazakhstan has been the sole leader of
independent Kazakhstan. Reﬂecting these weak demo-
cratic institutions, Kazakhstan’s high corruption, weak rule
of law, and political risk make it a less than ideal invest-
ment environment for foreign ﬁrms. Nevertheless, as
shown in Fig. 1, Chinese foreign direct investment there has
taken off over the past decade.
Blank (2009) of the Strategic Studies Institute at the
United States Army War College argues “China’s recentuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Fig. 1. Chinese FDI in Kazakhstan.
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nomic power to lend money to distressed governments
and/or ﬁrms and then uses that economic power and the
dependency it generates to secure political inﬂuence with
those states”. This raises the question of what China is
gaining by securing this political inﬂuence. I maintain that
China is using its economic power in order to secure the
“global investment activities” that Blank believes China is
using to enhance its political inﬂuence. The Kazakhstan
case supports my view: the greatest beneﬁt reaped by
Chinese investment policies in Kazakhstan is securing the
approval for and maintenance of natural resource in-
vestments there by China’s state-owned enterprises. It is
high levels of corruption, weak checks on the executive
branch, and low levels of transparency in Kazakhstan that
provide the avenues through which Chinese policies,
particularly foreign aid and loans, secure these goals. In
addition, these goals are facilitated by the ﬂexibility China’s
non-democratic regime has in dealing with the often non-
democratic governments of resource-rich states, which
have similar ﬂexibility. Fewer democratic constraints and a
lack of transparency mean that deals among elites can be
made that might be unacceptable to the general public in
both the FDI receiving (host) and sending (home) states.
Kazakhstan has what China and many other states seek:
natural resources. Perhaps ideally from the Chinese
perspective, Kazakhstan is landlocked and borders China to
the West. This means that Kazakh resources can be im-
ported to China without being transported through sea
lanes or external land routes that could be cut off quickly by
a foreign state in the event of future conﬂict (Strecker
Downs, 2000). Geography is also advantageous from the
Kazakh perspective; China offers a major export market
that does not require transport through a third country,
diversifying the Kazakh economy away from its historical
dependence on Russia. This win–win geoeconomic situa-
tion means that Chinese investment in Kazakhstan is in the
interest of both countries; nevertheless, to be successful
such investments also must be in the interest of political
leaders. It is this self-interest that motivates the policies of
both governments and it is these policies that secure and
protect Chinese investments in Kazakhstan, which lacksthe political and legal institutions that protect foreign in-
vestors from predatory behavior by governments.
Where “China” (more speciﬁcally, Chinese ﬁrms assisted
by the Chinese state) invests is partially driven by the
ability to acquire resources and markets in these states for
the Chinese Communist Party’s ambitious development
goals at home. As relative latecomers to globalization,
Chinese ﬁrms go where resources are and where they are
available; therefore, Kazakhstan has become an important
destination for efforts by China’s state-owned enterprises
in the petroleum sector to secure oil for the Chinese mar-
ket. The following study, which focuses on the China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation’s investments in Kazakhstan,
shows that Chinese foreign economic policies are key to
mitigating the risk faced by China’s state-owned enter-
prises investing there. The Chinese government and its
state-owned ﬁrms do so through the provision of aid and
loans to the Kazakh leadership. With such funding, China is
able to secure the support of the Kazakh leadership for
investments by Chinese state-owned enterprises. The case
study of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in
Kazakhstan, below, will detail how the Chinese govern-
ment strategy for investing in Kazakhstan has evolved from
one of simply buying off key members of the Kazakh gov-
ernment in order to gain approval for investments to one of
making institutions in the Kazakh state stakeholders in the
long-term success of the investment.
2. Chinese foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan
Chinese investment in Kazakhstan is a relatively recent
phenomenon, as it is in many developing countries. Ac-
cording to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, through 1999,
Chinese FDI in Kazakhstan totaled less than US $500
million; however, in 2008 alone, Chinese investment
reached nearly $700 million, despite a global slump in FDI
ﬂows, and surpassed that ﬁgure in 2009. China’s $1.62
billion invested in 2011 was topped only by France and the
Netherlands. From 2000 to 2011, accumulated Chinese FDI
in Kazakhstan exceeded $9 billion. These ﬁgures may
grossly underestimate Chinese investment in Kazakhstan;
the 2006 purchase of Nations Energy by CITIC, the Chinese
1 China’s geopolitical interests in the region include controlling ethnic
separatism, particularly among the Uighur population which extends
from China’s Xinjiang province into Kazakhstan; regional political sta-
bility; and balancing against US power in Central Asia.
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year in which ofﬁcial Kazakh ﬁgures show just $362.9
million invested by Chinese ﬁrms in Kazakhstan, and Chi-
nese ﬁgures show just $46 million (Statistical bulletin,
2007).
Chinese investment in Kazakhstan is nearly all by state-
owned enterprises. There are two reasons for this lack of
investment by private Chinese ﬁrms. First, SOEs dominate
China’s natural resource sector, and resources are what
Kazakhstan has to offer foreign investors. Second, private
Chinese ﬁrms do not have the advantages SOEs do,
described in detail next, needed to overcome Kazakhstan’s
poor investment environment. Unlike many destinations of
rising Chinese investment in Asia, such as Cambodia,
facilitated by links with the local ethnic Chinese commu-
nity, in Kazakhstan, cultural and linguistic dissimilarities
exacerbate difﬁculties faced by Chinese ﬁrms (Anonymous
A, personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009). In
addition, Kazakhstan’s low population makes it a relatively
small market, while its isolation from sea routes makes it a
poor export platform. For these reasons, Chinese private
ﬁrms, by and large, do not invest there.
While the bulk of Chinese investment in Kazakhstan is
by state-owned enterprises, many competing foreign ﬁrms
are privately owned. State ownership, especially Chinese
state ownership, gives these enterprises speciﬁc advan-
tages in competing against foreign ﬁrms as well as in
investing successfully in Kazakhstan over the long-run. One
U.S. ofﬁcial noted that is difﬁcult for private companies to
compete with the “terms and complexities” of Chinese in-
vestment packages, which not only provide loans to the
Kazakh government and its ﬁrms but also involve deals in
other areas, such as pipelines and investment in other
natural resources (Anonymous B, personal interview,
Astana, Kazakhstan, July 2009). China can put together
package deals that private ﬁrms cannot offer. While the U.S.
government does have several programs that promote in-
vestments by U.S. ﬁrms overseas, democratic accountability
places constraints on the depth of the private–public sector
relationship. For example, during our interview, the head of
Commercial Services for the U.S. Department of Commerce
in Kazakhstan noted that his efforts were mainly aimed at
expanding trade ties between U.S. ﬁrms and Kazakhstan, as
the U.S. government offered little support for American FDI
in Kazakhstan because Congress viewed it as “shipping jobs
overseas” (Anonymous C, personal interview, Almaty,
Kazakhstan, June 2009).
3. Theory: resources, revenues and rents
While there is much about Kazakhstan that is anathema
to foreign investors, such factors are outweighed by the fact
that Kazakhstan is resource rich and many of these re-
sources are yet to be exploited. Add to this its proximity to
China, and Kazakhstan is a rather obvious destination for
resource-seeking Chinese investors. While China has
geopolitical interests in Kazakhstan, agreements concluded
to date indicate that China’s main interest in its neighbor is
as a stable and nearby source of natural resources to fuel
China’s economic growth. Kazakhstan is a rather clear-cut
case of China using its foreign economic policy tools tosecure resources for its domestic economy.1 It is the means
used by China to secure the approval and protection of the
Kazakh government for these Chinese investments that
makes it an interesting case. The “host” (investment
receiving) state side of the equation also makes it so.
Kazakh leaders have their own reasons for wanting to
diversify Kazakhstan’s economy and foreign relations, and
China offers them opportunities to reap tremendous
beneﬁts.
From the standpoint of political theory, investments by
Chinese SOE’s in Kazakhstan and the Chinese government
ﬁnance supporting these investments expand the re-
sources available for the Kazakh political leadership,
namely President Nazarbayev, his family and closest asso-
ciates, to gain the support of the country’s “winning coa-
lition”, those whose support is needed to maintain power
(Bueno deMesquita, Smith, Siverson, &Morrow, 2003). The
desire of the Kazakh leadership to obtain current and po-
tential future inﬂows of capital make it in their self-interest
to approve Chinese investments and to protect them from
policy changes that would threaten the success of these
investments.
China provides not only revenues for the Kazakh gov-
ernment, including foreign aid and loans, but also rents for
those in position to capture them. Co-ownership by the
Kazakh state-owned oil company, KazMunaiGas, of many
major Chinese investments in the petroleum sector provide
additional resources. Morrison (2009), expanding on the
literature explaining how oil revenues help leaders to
maintain power, shows that increases in non-tax revenues,
including foreign aid, foreign borrowing and income
generated by state-owned enterprises, lead to greater sta-
bility in both democracies and autocracies. He suggests that
state ownership of oil companies may be the key factor
linking oil resource income and regime stability (see also:
Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Smith, 2004). Thus, Chinese
willingness both to allow the Kazakh state oil company a
majority share of Chinese investments in Kazakh oil and gas
and to fund the purchase of this Kazakh share in some
cases, is in China’s self-interest; it enhances political sta-
bility in Kazakhstan. Stability is important for all foreign
investors, but it is speciﬁcally the maintenance of the cur-
rent political system that, I show, protects Chinese
investments.
Ross (2001) ﬁnds support for several hypothesized links
between oil wealth and autocracy, including a “rentier ef-
fect”, or the ability of resource-rich countries to spend at
high rates and tax at low ones; a “repression effect”, or the
use of repressive domestic security forces; and a
“modernization effect”, which does not occur if resource
extraction rather than industrial and service jobs dominate
the economy. By providing the resources that undergrid
these effects, Chinese aid, loans and partnerships with
Kazakh oil companies enhance the Kazakh leadership’s
ability to stay in power. This also suggests that given
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during the recent global economic crisis, Chinese resources
were particularly crucial for Kazakh leaders to maintain
stability and their rule in that period.
There are two important advantages for many Chinese
ﬁrms investing in Kazakhstan: the nature of ﬁrm owner-
ship and the funding supporting these investments. As
mentioned above, nearly all major investments by Chinese
ﬁrms in Kazakhstan are by state-owned enterprises. Large
state-owned ﬁrms should be at an advantage in corrupt and
risky investment environments. The size of the investment
and the ownership type both indicate the involvement in
the investment agreement of political elites on both sides.
Because such investments are as much a part of bilateral
political relations as they are economic ties, both govern-
ments have a stake in their success. A government should
be less likely to enact policies harmful to a foreign ﬁrm if
that ﬁrm is based in a country with which it desires good
bilateral relations. This effect is ampliﬁed if the foreign ﬁrm
is state owned.
The protection offered by state ownership of the
investing ﬁrm is important, as Vernon’s (1971) obsolescing
bargaining theory illuminates how foreign investing ﬁrms
are at a disadvantage once their assets are in place. Prior to
investing, foreign ﬁrms have bargaining advantages, as the
potential host state government seeks to attract the foreign
investment. After the investment is in place, however, the
bargaining advantage switches to the host government, as
the ﬁrm will now incur signiﬁcant costs if it wishes to
relocate its foreign investment. These costs are much
greater for immobile investments, such as those in natural
resources, which require substantial expenditures by the
ﬁrm in infrastructure and heavy machinery which is difﬁ-
cult or impossible to remove. It is only in the long-run that
the ﬁrm can hope to recoup these costs and earn proﬁts.
The logic of the obsolescing bargain assumes that in-
vestment is a one-shot game. However, foreign in-
vestments by state-owned ﬁrms become an iterated game
(Axelrod, 1984); any defection by the host government
against a foreign state-owned enterprise jeopardizes future
investments from that state’s SOEs, as well as bilateral re-
lations. State ownership of the ﬁrm investing abroad,
therefore, deters defection by the host country government
on investment agreements.
The second key advantage for Chinese state-owned
ﬁrms investing abroad is ﬁnancial support from the Chi-
nese government. It is a characteristic of this funding that
makes it so potent as a foreign economic policy tool: unlike
much ‘Western’ ﬁnancial assistance, Chinese aid and loans
come without strings attached for political or economic
reform; they thus enhance rather than threaten the polit-
ical survival of the leadership in the receiving state. In order
not to jeopardize future inﬂows of such resources, the
foreign leadership should approve and protect Chinese
investments. While corruption in the FDI receiving state
usually deters foreign investors, it is a corrupt and non-
transparent environment that provides a means by which
the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises can
pursue this investment protection strategy. With these
ownership and funding advantages, Chinese ﬁrms are able
to overcome the difﬁculties inherent to successfullyinvesting in Kazakhstan and similarly hazardous invest-
ment environments.
4. All in the family: President Nursultan Nazarbayev
and his clan
Since breaking away from the former Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan has held fairly regular elections for parliament
and the presidency. Nevertheless, as noted above, the fact
that Nursultan Nazarbayev has been Kazakhstan’s only
president is an indication of the non-democratic nature of
the country’s political institutions, as is the fact that in
2010, there were no opposition party members in the lower
house of parliament. In April 2011, Nazarbayev won
reelection for the fourth time, with 95.5% of the vote. The
Polity Project gives Kazakhstan an overall score of 6 on
Polity’s10 to 10 continuum (from hereditary monarchy to
consolidated democracy) and claims, “Democratic in-
stitutions are weak and there are severe limitations on the
peoples’ right to change their government” (Marshall &
Jaggers, 2011).
As my theory builds on the work of Jensen (2008),
which shows that constraints on the executive of the gov-
ernment lower political risk for foreign investors, the most
relevant component of Polity’s score is the XCONST (exec-
utive constraints) measure. Polity gives Kazakhstan a 2 on a
1–7 scale on the XCONST measure, with 1 representing the
fewest constraints, indicating there are only “slight limi-
tations” on the behavior of those at the helm of Kazakh-
stan’s executive branch. According to Polity’s most recent
report, “the National Assembly generally serves as a rubber
stamp body . thus, the power of President Nazarbayev
goes largely unchecked” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011). Simi-
larly, the Global Integrity Report (2008), grades Kazakhstan
“weak” for executive accountability.
When I questioned Peter Svoik, the Deputy Chairman of
the opposition party, Azat, as to whether Kazakhstan was a
democracy, he stated, “It is the projection of democracy. All
(political) power is concentrated in the hands of one per-
son” and added that control of the economy is also in the
hands of that person. Interestingly, like nearly all those I
interviewed, he never mentioned President Nazarbayev by
name. Svoik also made the insightful comment that the
most important factor in Kazakh politics is that President
Nazarbayev has to delegate power in order to distribute
resources to those around him (personal interview, Almaty,
Kazakhstan, June 2009). Delegation of power presents
principal-agent risks; it will be shown that Nazarbayev
partially overcomes these risks by relying on family ties.
President Nazarbayev’s relatively unchecked power is
particularly problematic for foreign investors, who in more
democratic contexts rely on institutional protections for
their investments. On the other hand, a lack of executive
constraints means that Nazarbayev and his conﬁdants can
approve and protect foreign investments, with fewer con-
straints on their decisions and actions, if they see those
investments as in their self-interest. Having the executive
branch as an ally is key for the success of major investments
in Kazakhstan; what is crucial is giving those at the top a
stake in the success of the investment. As Vitaly Voronov,
Chairman of Transparency Kazakhstan, who worked for
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sition, told me: “The most protected business in
Kazakhstan is one with a powerful and inﬂuential partner.
Youmake this partner a stakeholder. Give them 20 or 30%”
(personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009).
These partners are often members of President Naza-
rbayev’s family. Two of the most powerful have been
Nazarbayev’s sons-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev and Timur Kuli-
bayev. As one Central Asia expert wrote in 2007, “Both
Aliyev and Kulibayev head the most inﬂuential ﬁnancial
groups in Kazakhstan, controlling the country’s key eco-
nomic sectors” (Marat, 2007). Aliyev, currently out of favor,
is the former husband of Dariga Nazarbayeva, the presi-
dent’s eldest daughter and potential successor since her
divorce from Aliyev, who had been Nazarbayev’s heir
apparent. While together, Dariga and Aliyev controlled
much of the print and television media in Kazakhstan. Prior
to his downfall, Aliyev admitted to owning half of Kahbar,
the 50% state-owned TV channel, KTK a private channel,
and both Karavan Weekly and Kazakhstan Today newspa-
pers (Auyezov, 2007).
Aliyev is the former deputy foreign minister and
ambassador to Austria, where he was sent after making it
known that he wished to run for the presidency at the end
of Nazarbayev’s term ending in 2012. He lost Nazarbayev’s
support, was accused of kidnapping and extortion, and
kicked out of the family (Barnes, 2007). He was also
accused in the murders of three top managers of Nurbank,
of which he owned 50%. In 2008, he was found guilty of
kidnapping and a coup attempt and given a 20 year sen-
tence in abstentia. Austria refused to extradite him due to
concerns he could not receive a fair trial in Kazakhstan
(Kazakh exile, 2009).
Timur Kulibayev, another Nazarbayev son-in-law, ap-
pears to have replaced Aliyev as most likely successor (Silk
Road Intelligencer, 2008). According to Forbes (2013),
Kulibayev and his wife Dinara, Nazarbayev’s second
daughter, are worthmore than $2 billion. He has controlled
much of Kazakhstan’s resource wealth through chairman-
ship of major state-owned resource companies KazMu-
naiGas (KMG), the Kazakh state run oil and gas company,
and Kazatomprom, the state uranium company, and, until
recently, as chairman of Samruk-Kazyna, a recently estab-
lished state holding company given the task of managing
the country’s resource wealth.2 According to Levine (2007),
author of The Oil and the Glory:
In Almaty, the most important fact for those wishing to
conduct oil business is that nothing substantial can be
done without a nod from Timur Kulibayev, the husband
of Nazarbayev’s second daughter-in-law, Dinara. Kuli-
bayev owns shares in oil ﬁelds, and those he does not
own he holds sway over through his inﬂuence in the
state oil company, KazMunaiGas.
In Kazakhstan, “state run” is somewhat synonymous
with “owned by the family”. A leaked cable from the U.S.2 Kulibayev was removed by Nazarbayev from this position following
violent worker riots in the energy industry but he maintains his other key
positions.embassy in Astana refers to Timur Kulibayev, the husband
of Nazarbayev’s daughter Kulibayeva Dinara Nursulta-
novna, as one of the “four most powerful gate-keepers
around President Nursultan Nazarbayev” and “the ulti-
mate controller of 90% of the economy of Kazakhstan” and
notes his “avarice for large bribes” (Kazakhstan: money and
power, 2010).
Below I will show how the support of Timur Kulibayev
has been crucial to gaining approval and protection for
major investments in this sector.
Several interviewees, including some with ﬁrst-hand
knowledge of the inner workings of the powerful execu-
tive branch of the Kazakh government, suggested that the
beneﬁciaries of Chinese investment and Chinese govern-
ment policies in support of that investment are Kazakh
“ﬁnancial groups” with close, often familial ties to Presi-
dent Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev has been independent
Kazakhstan’s only executive leader because he has been
successful in dividing resources among key power bases
(the “winning coalition”) while simultaneously preventing
the rise of an opposition strong enough to threaten his
leadership. A 2005 report by the Eurasian Center for Po-
litical Research and the Epicenter Agency for Social Tech-
nologies identiﬁed ﬁve “inﬂuence groups” which assert
their interests by vying for leverage over Kazakh politicians.
Four “top-level” groups struggle for inﬂuence on Naza-
rbayev’s group, which sits atop the inﬂuence group pyra-
mid. The ﬁrst group was that of Nazarbayev’s eldest
daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva and (previously) her former
husband, Rakhat Aliev, now superceded by the second, that
of Timur Kulibayev and his wife, Nazarbayev’s second
daughter, Dinara. The third is that of Nurzhan Sub-
khanberdin, chair of Kazkommertsbank, the largest private
bank in Kazakhstan. The fourth is the “Eurasian group”,
made up of ethnic-Russian Kazakhs involved in the metals
sector. It is worth noting that Dinara Kulibayeva, Timur
Kulibayev, Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, plus the three heads of
the Eurasian group are among the very few Kazakhs who
have made the Forbes (2007, 2013) list of billionaires. Forbes
(2007) notes that Subkhanberdin is tied politically to Timur
Kulibayev.When I questioned a former government advisor
on China as to who beneﬁts from Chinese investment in
Kazakhstan, he initially replied, “Kazakhstan beneﬁts”. He
then quickly, and without prodding, amended his state-
ment, “really, the ﬁnancial groups beneﬁt” (Anonymous A,
personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009).
Keeping Kazakh political succession in the family would
be to China’s beneﬁt. The less the change at the executive
level, the greater the stability in Sino-Kazakh relations. The
weakness in China’s strategy is its reliance on the current
leadership for protection of its investments. Familial suc-
cession, however, is a continuation of the current leader-
ship. It is foolhardy to predict the policies of a successor,
even if that successor is a blood relative. However, it is clear
that the Kazakh leadership, especially several Nazarbayev
family members, gain personally from Sino-Kazakh re-
lations. They beneﬁt from the status quo and would,
therefore, be less likely to change it. Nevertheless, as will be
shown below, China now engages the support of not only
top government leaders but also, with an eye toward more
distant time horizons, the relevant government
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national oil company.
5. The Kazakhstan investment environment: risk,
corruption and weak rule of law
As Chinese ﬁrms seek resources for their domestic
market, Kazakhstan’s small population and lack of sea
routes are not a deterrent to Chinese state investors. In the
terms common in the FDI literature, these are resource-
seeking, not market-seeking or efﬁciency-seeking foreign
investors (Caves, 1974). However, Chinese ﬁrms still must
secure approval for investments and overcome an institu-
tional environment that could jeopardize their success.
Kazakhstan has enacted several laws to encourage and
protect foreign investment. These include the Law on In-
vestment (2003), the Law on Government Procurement
(1997), and the Customs Code (2003). These are designed,
according to Political Risk Services (PRS), to “provide for
non-expropriation; currency convertibility; guarantees of
stability in the legal regime; transparent government pro-
curement; and incentives in certain priority sectors”. PRS
concludes, however, “inconsistent implementation of these
laws and reforms at all levels of government remains the
key obstacle to business in Kazakhstan” (2008 investment
climate, 2009).
Risk rating agencies and non-governmental organiza-
tions agree that Kazakhstan is a relatively risky and corrupt
environment. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010) gives
Kazakhstan a “D” rating for overall risk, with the same
rating for political stability risk and an even lower rating of
E (indicating highest risk) for “legal and regulatory risk”.
The Belgian Export Credit Agency (Country risks summary,
2010) ranks Kazakhstan a 4 on a 1–7 scale (with 7 indi-
cating highest risk) for “risk of expropriation and govern-
ment action”, a 5 for both “transfer risk” (related to
currency conversion) and medium/long-term political risk,
and a grade of “C” or “high” for commercial risk, which
includes risk posed by corruption.
Corruption is endemic in Kazakhstan. Transparency In-
ternational’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (2013)
(CPI) ranks Kazakhstan 140th out of 175 countries, with a
lower rank indicating higher corruption. Vitaly Voronov,
Chairman of Transparency Kazakhstan, told me that
nepotism is widespread in the Kazakh government and,
given the importance of tribalism historically, it is not
viewed locally as corruption (Personal interview, Almaty,
Kazakhstan, June 2009). Among many Kazakhs I spoke
with, corruption, speciﬁcally bribery, was viewed as an
acceptable means to ends. As Jalilov (2008) of the Global
Integrity Network writes: “Corruption schemes are built
into the country’s psyche. People justify corruption as away
to build relationships or break through government-imposed
barriers (emphasis added)”.
Businesspeople interviewed for a 2003 report, “Per-
ceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan”, by the United Na-
tions Development Program, suggested “the most typical
spheres of bribery are the customs, tax police, police at
large, army, controlling bodies and the sectors connected
with natural resources (emphasis added)” (Jandosova,
Baitugelova, Jansosova, & Kunitsa, 2003). Given theenormous ﬁnancial stakes, corruption is particularly prob-
lematic for those investing in natural resources. According
to the Global Advice Network (2010): “There are massive
possibilities for corruption on a grand scale in Kazakhstan’s
environment of intra-elite allocation of beneﬁts connected
to oil production. Corruption in Kazakhstan is systemic,
even within the country’s anti-corruption agency, and no
public ofﬁce is free from executive interference” (emphasis
added). As a U.S. Department of Commerce diplomat in
Almaty put it, “Corruption is the cost of doing business in
Kazakhstan” (Anonymous C, personal interview, Almaty,
Kazakhstan, June 2009).
However, executive interference also can beneﬁt foreign
investors. While corruption has been found to deter foreign
investment (Li & Resnick, 2003; Wei, 2000), ironically, it is
corruption and a lack of transparency that provide the
vehicle used by the Chinese to secure approval and pro-
tection of Chinese investments in Kazakhstan, at leastwhen
those investments are large and by state-owned Chinese ﬁrms.
Smaller private investors from China avoid Kazakhstan for
fear that they will be “bled dry” by low level corruption, as
one interviewee put it (Anonymous A, personal interview,
Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009). For these ﬁrms, motivated
solely by proﬁts, the “cost of doing business” does not
outweigh the beneﬁts (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). Some
foreign ﬁrms, however, can use corruption to their advan-
tage (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985); corruption and a lack of
transparency mean that aid and loans from China can be
used by President Nazarbayev and other top leaders to
enhance their personal wealth and maintain the allegiance
of key supporters. It is this corrupt and opaque environ-
ment, along with the unconditional and unconstrained
nature of Chinese foreign economic assistance, that make
the Kazakh and Chinese leaders such compatible bedfel-
lows. As Voronov, the head of Transparency Kazakhstan,
noted, “a powerful and inﬂuential partner” is needed as a
“stakeholder” to protect foreign investments in
Kazakhstan (Personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June
2009). This was precisely the strategy successfully followed
initially by the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC).
6. Chinese investments in Kazakh oil and gas
6.1. Securing approval and protection
Support by the Chinese government for investments by
China’s state-owned enterprises in Kazakhstan is a straight
forward example of the means by which foreign in-
vestments can be approved and secured, at least in the
short-term, where rule of law is weak and corruption is
high: the protection of the key players can be bought.
Chinese oil companies engaging in bribery to secure
approval of deals are not unique; they are playing a game
whose rules were written by major Western oil companies
long ago. What is unique is the role of the Chinese gov-
ernment in providing massive ﬁnancial support for its
state-owned ﬁrms and in pushing these ﬁrms to secure not
only proﬁts but also resources. It is these mixed motiva-
tions as both proﬁt seekers and arms of the government
that give Chinese SOE’s greater options; their major
Table 1
Chinese (CNPC) Oilﬁeld development projects and investments in
Kazakhstan.
Year Project (percentage ownership) Comments
1997 AktobeMunaiGas (60%) $325 million.
Additional 25% purchased
in 2003
2003 North Buzachi Oilﬁeld (50%)
with Lukoil
Lukoil is Russian national
oil company
2004 Konys and Bektas Oilﬁeld (25%) 75% now owned by
ZhenHua Oil
2005 AyDanMunai – Aryss and
Blinov blocks (100%)
2005 PetroKazakhstan (100%) $4.18 billion.
Later transferred 33% of
shares to Kazakh national
oil company
2009 MangistauMunaiGas (50%) $2.6 billion
Reportedly previously
owned by exiled Rakhat
Aliyev
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may not be proﬁts. This means that Chinese ﬁrms can
outbid those solely motivated by proﬁt-seeking, and the
Chinese government can provide the funds that allow them
to do so. Chinamakes no bones about offering aid and loans
to Kazakhstan in order to secure approval for natural
resource investments. The agreement and announcement
of the investment and loan deals are simultaneous and by
elites at the highest levels of both governments.
In addition to showing substantively how investment
approval can be bought, the examples below offer support
for my theoretical claim that Chinese government support
secures protection for these investments. This protection is
important given the logic of Vernon’s obsolescing bargai-
ning theory, discussed above. While not citing Vernon,
Weinthal and Luong’s (2001) ﬁndings nevertheless show
how this logic has played out precisely in Kazakhstan:
While in the short-term, it was easier for the foreign
investors in Kazakhstan to bargain with the central
government and receive a favorable tax regime, their
bargaining position has weakened over time as their
assets have become ﬁxed and their sunk costs have
increased . with time, (the) tax code has become less
stable as the government has consistently reneged on
their agreements with foreign investors (p. 222).
Because of these ex-post bargaining disadvantages,
ﬁrms must ﬁnd ways to reduce the risk that government
actors will renege on the original investment agreement.
Chinese government policies do this by making continued
investments by Chinese ﬁrms in the interest of Kazakh
leaders. These policies offer the Kazakh leadership more
than Western ﬁrms can (realistically and legally); large
loans associated with these investments expand the pool of
resources available to the Kazakh leadership for private
gain and for providing private goods for key supporters of
the government, as well as public goods for the general
populace. In short, where rule of man trumps rule of law,
that man must be given a stake in a foreign investment’s
success in order to secure his support. Chinese policies give
the Kazakh leadership just such a stake.
6.2. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in
Kazakhstan
Nearly all Chinese investment in Kazakhstan is in nat-
ural resource extraction and related industries dominated
by state-owned enterprises. There are three major Chinese
petroleum companies, but due to its historic role in North
and Western China, the China National Petroleum Corpo-
ration (CNPC) has been the dominant player in Kazakhstan,
on China’s Northwest border. Its listed subsidiary, Petro-
China, of which it owns 86%, became the most valuable
company in the world in 2010, according to the FT Global
500 (2010), with a market value of $329 billion. CNPC has
interests in 29 countries, including Iran, Sudan, Venezuela,
Myanmar, and the Central African Republic, suggesting it is
unconstrained as to where it invests.
CNPC entered Kazakhstan in 1997 and invested
approximately $6.5 billion over the following decade.
Major investments are listed in Table 1. Over the past fewyears, the company, with the help of the Chinese govern-
ment, has greatly expanded its petroleum and gas conces-
sions in Kazakhstan and constructed the pipelines needed
to export their product to China. Strongly supporting the
theory I advance, the Chinese government and CNPC have
been explicit in giving the Kazakh government a direct
stake in Chinese investments, both by linking loans to the
Kazakh government with investment deals and by
providing the Kazakh national oil company, KazMunaiGas
(KMG), partial ownership. Agreements are made at the top
levels of both governments and dominate Sino-Kazakh
bilateral relations.
I analyze three cases of investments by the Chinese
National Petroleum Corporation in Kazakhstan. These cases
not only illustrate how approval for resource investments
can be bought in Kazakhstan but also show that the CNPC
and Chinese government strategy has evolved from one of
direct bribery of relevant ofﬁcials (perhaps how Western
ﬁrms also gained a foothold in Kazakhstan) to one of
providing the Kazakh government with ﬁnancial assistance
(aid/loans) and KMG with a direct stake in the investments
in order to gain longer-term protection.6.3. AktobeMunaiGas
CNPC’s ﬁrst foray into Kazakhstan was in 1997, when
with the active support of Chinese Premier Li Peng, it
purchased a 60% share in AktobeMunaiGas, the fourth
largest oil and gas company in the country, beating out
several U.S., European and Russian ﬁrms (Pomfret, 2001).
According to Strecker Downs (2000, p.16) now at
Brookings Institution:
The key to CNPC’s success in beating out Texaco, Amoco,
and Russia’s Yujnimost for the tenderwere two offers the
other companies could not match. CNPC agreed to pay up-
front a $320 million bonus to the cash-strapped Kazakh
government and to conduct a feasibility study on the
construction of an 1800-mile pipeline . to Western
China estimated to cost $3.5 billion, which would
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(emphasis added).
In 2003, CNPC purchased an additional 25% of
AktobeMunaiGas.
Mukhtar Ablyazov, Kazakhstan’s exiled former Energy
Minister, has accused Timur Kulibayev, President Naza-
rbayev’s son-in-law and possible successor, of having sold
the additional 25% share of AktobeMunaiGas to CNPC far
belowmarket price (and half of the asking price). According
to Ablyazov, the additional quarter stake was sold for only
$150 million in 2003, a year in which proﬁts for the com-
panywere $244million. Ablyazov claimed that in return for
approval of CNPC’s purchase of AktobeMunaiGas, Kulibayev
directed CNPC to establish a company in the British Virgin
Islands controlling Aktobe, sell a 49% stake in this company
to Darley Investment Services (a ﬁrm owned by Ablyazov’s
business partner) for just $49, and then repurchase these
shares $165.9 million. Reports of the allegations were
initially banned in Kazakhstan and newspapers printing
them, seized (Chazan, 2010; Gizitdinov, 2010).
Ablyazov’s claims of corruption could be viewed as a
contrived attempt to tarnish the reputation of the Kazakh
leadership following his ouster; however, documents he
released to Kazakh security ofﬁcials, along with other docu-
ments concerning these transactions, corroborate the $49
($1.00 foreachof49 shares) sellingprice toDarley, aswell asa
$140 million repurchase by a CNPC subsidiary, plus an addi-
tional repurchase of $25.9 million by another CNPC subsidi-
ary,which sums to the $165.9million suggested byAblyazov.
According to its “Certiﬁcate of Incumbency”, dated
September 21, 2005, CICL, the offshore company that Kuli-
bayev allegedly instructed CNPC to create, was incorporated
in the British Virgin Islands on April 23, 2003. Three di-
rectors listed wereWu Dongshan, Wang Mingcia, and Zhao
Ying.Wu andWangwere high-level employees of CNPC and
CNPC HK (Hong Kong) International, respectively. Zhao was
a high-level ofﬁcial from the China National Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC), a
CNPC subsidiary that manages overseas investments. Other
documents conﬁrm these transactions and the end result of
CNPC ownership of 100% of AktobeMunaiGas.
The means used by CNPC to purchase AktobeMunaiGas
illustrates the crucial role of the Kazakh leadership, namely
President Nazarbayev and his family, in approving major
foreign investments in Kazakhstan. However, the Chinese
strategy has evolved since the purchase of AktobeMunai-
Gas. I contend that this is because, due to the nature of the
obsolescing bargain, it is not enough to gain approval for an
investment through bribery; it is necessary to also gain
long-term protection for that investment. The new Chinese
strategy of providing aid/loans for oil access gains both
approval and protection; rather than buying just the
approval of current key ﬁgures, it gives the Kazakh national
oil company a long-term stake in the success of the in-
vestment. This is necessary for two reasons. First, given the
lack of information regarding Nazarbayev’s likely successor,
political risk in Kazakhstan is high. Therefore, securing the
support of a key government ﬁgure now may not secure
protection for an investment in the long-run. Second, the
Kazakh government has been pressuring foreign petroleumﬁrms to renegotiate the terms of earlier deals. Relevant to
the research here, Luong (2010, p. 2) notes, “Forced contract
renegotiation is consistent with Raymond Vernon’s (1971)
theory of the obsolescing bargain” and adds “foreign oil
companies operating in the country have long complained
of the state’s tendency to renege on contractual terms”. In
2008, for example, KazMunaiGas (KMG) pressuredWestern
oil companies and the Russian state oil company, Lukoil, to
double KMG’s share of the Kashagan ﬁelds and has been
pressing several Western ﬁrms to provide it a greater share
in the giant Karachaganak concession (Sharip, 2011). These
efforts by the Kazakh government to reassert control of
concessions formerly given to private Western oil com-
panies illustrate the advantage of the Chinese strategy of
securing long-term protection from policy change by giving
the Kazakh national oil company a stake in its success. The
cases of PetroKazakhstan and MangistauMunaiGas exem-
plify this strategy.
6.4. PetroKazakhstan
On October 27, 2005, the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) purchased the Canadian-registered
ﬁrm PetroKazakhstan (PK), whose oil and gas assets were
all in Kazakhstan, for $4.18 billion, the largest Chinese
foreign investment in the world at that time. The CNPC
purchase was opposed by many in the Kazakh parliament,
which had passed a law just two weeks earlier, to stave off
the investment, giving the government the right to inter-
vene in foreign purchases of oil assets (Pitt, 2005a).
Nevertheless, prior to the purchase, CNPC ofﬁcials had
claimed that strong Sino-Kazakh relations would guarantee
the success of its bid (Pitt, 2005b). According to the Chinese
government (China-embassy.org, 2005):
Upon acquisition, in the spirit of win–win and mutual
beneﬁt, CNPC will choose to cooperate with KazMu-
naiGaz, the state oil company of Kazakhstan to operate
and manage the PK project. The two parties signed a
memorandum of understanding on Oct. 15, according to
which KazMunaiGas will obtain a certain amount of PK
shares enough to have strategic control over the
development of the country’s mineral resources..
Less than a year later, on July 5, 2006, CNPC announced
(CNPC in Kazakhstan, 2009):
According to an agreement with the Kazakh Ministry of
EnergyandMineralResources,CNPCtransferred33%of its
shares ($1.37 billion) in PetroKazakhstan toKazMunaiGaz
. and retained the remaining 67% stake in the company.
With that, CNPC gave the Kazakh national oil company a
direct stake in its investment. Giving KMG a stake secures
long-term protection for the investment as well as the
approval of Kulibayev, the former CEO of KazMunaiGas and
Deputy CEO of Kazakhstan’s National Wellbeing Fund,
Samruk-Kazyna, which owns KazMunaiGas.
6.5. MangistauMunaiGas
The 2009 joint purchase of MangistauMunaiGas (MMG)
for $2.6 billion by CNPC and KMG is an illuminating display
Table 2
CNPC pipelines from Kazakhstan to China.
Northwest crude pipeline 49%
stake with KMG in the
(operational in 2003)
448 km-Long crude pipeline
from Atyrau to Kenkiyak
China Crude Oil Pipeline 50%
with KMG (operational 2006)
962 km-long crude pipeline
from Atasu to Alashankou,
China Kumkol-Kenkiyak
pipeline to be completed
this year
Pan Central Asia Gas Pipeline
Construction began in 2008
Brings Turkmenistan gas
/ Uzbekistan/ Kazakhstan
/ China
Eventually should extend to
Kazakh gas ﬁelds in Caspian
Alternative to Russian pipelines
D.C. O’Neill / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 145–156 153of the lengths to which the Chinese government will go to
guarantee investments by its state-owned oil companies.
CNPC loaned KMG $5 billion, $1.3 billion of which was to
allow the Kazakh state-owned oil company to secure 50%
plus one share of MangistauMunaiGas (Personal in-
terviews, June and July, 2009). Simultaneously, a $5 billion
loan from the Chinese Export Import Bank to the
Kazakhstan Development Bank was announced. In all, $10
billion dollars was loaned by China (the state and one of its
oil companies) to Kazakhstan (the state and one of its oil
companies), partially to secure half of a $2.6 billion in-
vestment. This is a clear-cut example of both the type of
“package deal” the Chinese government and its SOEs can
makewith foreign governments, as well as of China’s giving
Kazakh political leaders and institutions a direct stake in
the success of a Chinese investment.
The examples of CNPC’s purchase of PetroKazakhstan
andMangistauMunaiGas support my hypothesis that China
uses foreign economic assistance to secure approval and
protection of investments by Chinese state companies
abroad. In Kazakhstan, the high level of corruption, lack of
transparency and one party – or perhaps more accurately,
one family – dominance of the political systemmean that it
is very likely a percentage of these ﬁnancial inﬂows are
being used for the private gain of the leadership and the
provision of private goods to the leader’s supporters. As one
diplomat in Astana said about China’s $5 billion loan, “Who
knows where that money is going?” (Anonymous B, per-
sonal interview, July 2009).
Chinese policies create a win–win situation, an equi-
librium that protects Chinese investments. When ques-
tioned about the logic behind China’s strategy of
purchasing oil companies and then providing shares to
KMG, the Chinese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng
Guoping, replied, “Yes, CNPC has done such deals. First it
buys and then transfers a part of its shares to the Kazakh
side. This is our general policy in Kazakhstan. Its purpose is
to provide development to both parties on the basis of
mutual beneﬁt. We seek to provide a real beneﬁt to both
sides from this cooperation” (Konyrova, 2009).
6.6. The New Silk Road
Crucial to Kazakhstan’s strategy of diversifying its
foreign economic relations is the creation of alternate
export transit routes. Prior to the recent opening of pipe-
lines to China, Kazakh oil had to be exported via pipelines
through Russia (to theWest or East), across the Caspian Sea
to Turkey or Azerbaijan, or by rail. New gas pipelines will
also provide alternatives to the Russian transport monop-
oly for Central Asian states, allowing Turkmen gas to be
pumped through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China and
eventually will allow Kazakh gas from the Caspian Sea to be
transported directly to China. In a sign of its importance to
the PRC, then Chinese President Hu Jintao opened the
Kazakh portion of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline in
mid-December 2009. This $6.7 billion gas pipeline was
funded primarily by the China Development Bank (China
President, 2009). The Kazakhstan–China portion of the
gas pipeline was completed on December 12, 2009,
allowing the entire Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline to beput into use on December 14, 2009 (CNPC in Kazakhstan,
2010).
At the opening of the Atasu to Alashankou section of the
China Crude Oil Pipeline in Kazakhstan, CNCP Vice Presi-
dent Zhou Jinping described the pipeline as “The New Silk
Road” in reference to what for centuries was the key trade
route between China and the West (Pala, 2006). Perhaps
“silk” in the autonym should be replaced by a petroleum-
based ﬁber. CNPC has a 50–50 split with KMG in this
Kazakhstan–China crude oil pipeline. By diversifying
Kazakhstan’s export markets and China’s import sources,
the pipeline creates another win–win situation: China gets
a new source of petroleum from next door, while
Kazakhstan secures alternatives to transport through
Russia. The construction of this New Silk Road (Table 2) is
further evidence of China’s strategy of giving the Kazakh
government a stake in its investments.
Investments by CNPC in Kazakhstan are the most visible
Chinese activity there. However, China and its state-owned
enterprises have followed similar strategies in securing
other major investments. The CITIC group, a state-owned
enterprise overseeing investments abroad, spent $1.9
billion to purchase the Kazakhstan assets of Nation’s En-
ergy Company in 2006. In order to secure the approval of
the Kazakh government, CITIC gave KazMuaniGas a one-
year option to purchase 50% of the assets (CITIC buys,
2006). KMG exercised that option in 2007, at a cost of
$930 million. In April 2009, China Guangdong Nuclear
Power Co (CGNPC) announced the co-development of a
Kazakh uranium mine together with Kazatomprom, the
Kazakh state uranium company, then headed by Timur
Kulibayev. The Moinak Hydro Power Station, majority
owned by the Kazakh state-owned KazKuat, was partially
ﬁnanced through a $200 million extension of credit from
the China Development Bank. Terms of the agreement
allowed for Chinese construction workers and equipment
purchases from Chinese companies (USA Trade Online,
2010). Complicating Sino-Kazakh ties further, the China
Investment Corporation (CIC), a Chinese sovereign wealth
fund of nearly $300 billion, purchased an 11% share in JSC
KazMunaiGas Exploration Production, a London-listed arm
of KazMunaiGas, the Kazakh state-owned oil and gas
company (Duce, 2009). CITIC Capital, the investment sub-
sidiary of CITIC, has recently established a joint venture
with a subsidiary of Kazyna Sustainable Growth Fund, the
3 A Western diplomat in Astana noted that because Chinese ﬁrms are
SOEs they can outbid other ﬁrms for contracts and then simply pay the
ﬁnes when they do not live up to the details, such as the number of
domestic workers required (Personal interview, anonymous interviewee
B, Astana, Kazakhstan, July 2009).
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Kulibayev (Joint ventures, 2012). The Chinese strategy of
giving the Kazakh government a stake in its investments
goes well beyond investments by CNPC.
7. Conclusion
Sophie Richardson, in her book on China’s Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence, writes: “Some argue that
China’s aid gives it particularly good access to countries
with energy resources, yet little persuasive work has been
done to suggest that without the aid packages China would
be denied such beneﬁts” (p. 3). I hope that I have made the
case for that argument persuasively. Loans and aid from the
Chinese government are a crucial part of offers the Kazakh
government could not refuse.
The main hypothesis of the theory presented above is
that it is Chinese government policies in support of Chinese
ﬁrms investing abroad that allow these enterprises to
successfully invest in states with weak rule of law, high
corruption and high political risk. The CNPC case offers
support for this hypothesis, and the additional hypothesis
that state-owned ﬁrms have advantages investing in such
poor investment environments. Very few private Chinese
companies invest in Kazakhstan, despite promises by the
Chinese government to increase private investment there.
In an interview, a top Kazakh researcher on China cited an
unpublished Chinese government study suggesting that
the Kazakh investment environment is not good for Chi-
nese ﬁrms. The reasons cited were that the Kazakh people
are “anti-Chinese” and that police and others apply too
much pressure on Chinese business owners, demanding
bribes, for example. This pressure is particularly problem-
atic given the business owners’ inability to speak Russian or
Kazakh, as well as the dramatic cultural differences
(Anonymous A, personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan,
June 2009).
Chinese state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, are
able to overcome these difﬁculties through the backing of
the Chinese state. The increasingly close relationship be-
tween the Chinese and Kazakh governments provides a
measure of protection for state-owned Chinese ﬁrms
investing in Kazakhstan. As this same Kazakh expert on
China suggested, the energy sector is not as problematic for
Chineseﬁrms (majorﬁrms being state owned in this sector),
who have “powerful friends” in the Kazakh government and
are supported at its highest levels (Anonymous A, personal
interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009).
This study shows how Chinese loans and aid gain the
support of the Kazakh leadership for Chinese investments
by creating a win–win status quo for the Chinese and
Kazakh governments. The Chinese government secures
access to much needed resources and potential proﬁts for
Chinese state-owned ﬁrms. The Kazakh government re-
ceives ﬁnancial resources from China that leaders can use
to provide public goods for the people of Kazakhstan or
private goods for keymembers of the government and their
families and supporters.
The Chinese investment strategy in risky, corrupt
states, such as Kazakhstan, advantages Chinese state-
owned enterprises over other states’ multinationalenterprises. First, the sheer amount of funding that Chi-
nese ﬁrms and their government backers are able to offer
foreign governments is greater even than that which the
world’s largest private ﬁrms can offer. Second, the fact that
Chinese SOEs are not solely motivated by proﬁts but also
by the goal of securing resources for China, means that
Chinese SOEs can outbid private ﬁrms.3 This also means
they may have longer time horizons than private ﬁrms. As
opposition party leader Peter Stoic told me, “the Chinese
move slowly, step by step, in order to reach their aims”
(Personal interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009).
These longer time horizons mean Chinese ﬁrms can focus
more on long-term aims than short-term proﬁts. Third,
because continued Chinese investments and aid are in the
interest of the Kazakh leadership, it is in their interest to
protect Chinese investments from lower level corruption
and adverse policy changes. In addition, agreements for
major investments by Chinese SOEs in Kazakhstan are
made by the top leaders of both countries; therefore
reneging on an agreement is harmful to bilateral relations.
As Chinese ﬁrms are state owned and supported by the
top leaders of the Chinese government, agreements with
Chinese SOEs become, in simple game theory terms, an
iterated game. This iteration promotes cooperation be-
tween the two sides and makes defection by the Kazakh
leadership less likely (Axelrod, 1984). Whether the Chinese
strategy actually protects Chinese ﬁrms from long-term
political risk awaits to be seen. However, as Stoic related,
“Relations with China are too important for even the next
leader to move against China’s assets” (Personal interview,
Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 2009).
This puts ﬁrms from other countries at a disadvantage.
As the U.S. ofﬁcial in Astana noted, “Our deals are done
between companies”; whereas, China is engaged in state to
state summits to secure oil deals. He added, “U.S. com-
panies wouldn’t necessarily want us in the negotiating
room. Conoco Phillips didn’t even invite us to the signing
ceremony”. He pithily continued, “Exxon can’t compete
with CNPC because they’re really competing with China,
Inc”. Exxon ofﬁcials say it is hard to compete with the
Chinese, not only because of billions of dollars in loans but
also the terms and complexities of these deals: “There’s a
$5 billion cash transfer, $5 billion investment, plus a ura-
nium agreement. then there’s the pipelines. U.S. ﬁrms
can’t compete with these packages” (Anonymous B, per-
sonal interview, Astana, Kazakhstan, July 2009).
Leila Maratovna Muzaparova at Kazakhstan Institute for
Strategic Studies, a think tank under the ofﬁce of the
president, put the Kazakh government’s ofﬁcial view
clearly:
China is a great power and a close neighbor. Kazakhstan
should not try to make an enemy with such a country
but to get beneﬁts from the close location. Kazakhstan
must take into consideration the $10 billion loan during
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economic cooperation . The $10 billion in loans is not
big for China, but is big for Kazakhstan. China gave .
other countries didn’t! (Personal interview, Almaty,
Kazakhstan, June 2009).
The Kazakh government must balance its desire for di-
versity in its foreign relations, known as its “multivector”
strategy, against the beneﬁts it receives from Chinese
ﬁnancial ﬂows in the form of investment, aid and loans. The
private beneﬁts members of the Kazakh government
receive from inﬂows of Chinese ﬁnancial resources must be
weighed against the public beneﬁts achieved through
foreign policy diversity. The future will test the inherent
tension between China’s investment strategy and Kazakh-
stan’s multivector foreign policy approach. The latter sug-
gests that there are limits to China’s inﬂuence over the
Kazakh government. However, the growing number of joint
ventures between the twostates’ state-ownedﬁrms suggest
that their governments’ goals may continue to converge.
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